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VENUE-JURIES: CHANGING VENUE TO OBTAIN A FAIR
AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL: TRIAL COURT DISCRETION OR
SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION? IS THIS THE END OF
TRIALS IN RURAL NORTH DAKOTA COUNTIES?
Slaubaugh v. Slaubaugh, 499 N.W.2d 99 (N.D. 1993)
I. FACTS
Karen Slaubaugh sustained serious personal injuries in a one-vehicle
accident on April 13, 1986.1 She brought suit against the driver of the
vehicle, Pierce County, and Wold Engineering for negligence.2
Slaubaugh also asserted a punitive damages claim against Wold Engineer-
ing and Pierce County.3
Trial was held in Pierce County in May, 1989.' A jury awarded dam-
ages to Slaubaugh in the amount of $233,000 for past and future medical
expenses, past and future lost wages, and permanent disability.5 On
appeal, the supreme court reversed and remanded for a new trial.6 In
that appeal, the supreme court declined Slaubaugh's request to change
venue on remand, stating that the district court was in a better position to
make that decision.7
A second jury trial in Pierce County was scheduled for March 23,
1992.8 A venire panel of 100 individuals was assembled and voir dire
proceeded in chambers, two or three individuals at a time.9 The court
conducted its own examination of the prospective jurors to determine
1. Slaubaugh v. Slaubaugh, 466 N.W.2d 573,576 (N.D. 1991) [hereinafter Slaubaugh I]. Karen
was a passenger in a vehicle driven by her husband, Wilmer Slaubaugh. Id. The vehicle sped
through an unmarked "-r intersection and hit a railroad embankment Id.
2. Id. The claims against Pierce County and Wold Engineering were based on negligence for
failing to place traffic control or warning signs on the road In question, on which improvements had
been undertaken. Slaubaugh v. Slaubaugh, 499 N.W.2d 99, 101 (N.D. 1993) [hereinafter Slaubaugh
II]. Wold Engineering was the project engineer for road improvements. Slaubaugh 1 466 N.W.2d at
576.
3. Slaubaugh I, 466 N.W.2d at 576. The district court dismissed the claims for punitive
damages prior to trial. Id. at 581. The North Dakota Supreme Court ordered reinstatement of the
punitive damages claim against Pierce County on remand. Id at 582.
4. Brief for Appellant Wold Engineering at 2, Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d 99 (N.D. 1993) (No.
920142) [hereinafter Wold's Brief].
5. Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d at 101. Nothing was awarded to the plaintiff for pain, discomfort,
and mental anguish, rd. Liability was apportioned forty percent to Slaubaugh an sixty percent to
Defendant Wilmer Slaubaugh. Id
6. i; Slaubaugh 1, 466 N.W.2d at 583. The grounds for reversal were the district court's
improperly allowing Defendants to overemphasize Slaubaugh's possession of marijuana; the jury
veidict being contrary to the evidence; the jury instructions erroneously emphasizing language
ifavorable to the defendants"; the erroneous dismissal of Slaubaugh's punitive damages claim; and an
erroneous ruling of inadmissibility of photographs Slaubaugh sought to introduce. Slaubaugh I1, 499
N.W.2d at 101 n.1.
7. Slaubaugh 1, 466 N.W.2d at 583; Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 101.
8. Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d at 101.
9. Wold's Brief, supra note 4, at 3. Trial was to be before a jury of nine. Id. at 4. No decision as
to the number of peremptory challenges had yet been made. Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 105.
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whether anything in their background would prevent them from being
fair and impartial.'0 Extensive voir dire was then conducted by counsel.1'
After two days, fifty prospective jurors had been examined and twenty
remained. 12 None of those twenty had been challenged on the grounds of
statutory cause for juror dismissal.'3  At that time, the court expressed
"concern about many of the prospective jurors."14 The court was dis-
turbed by jurors who knew the parties and potential witnesses, who were
related to the parties, who were clients of the attorneys, who knew things
about the case, and who had traveled on the road in question.'- The
court stated it had never before been involved in a case where so many
prospective jurors had potential challenges for cause.1 6
At the start of the third day of voir dire, Slaubaugh renewed her
motion to change venue.' 7 The motion was based on several grounds.
First, Slaubaugh's counsel voiced his concern about the responses of
some jurors, who were also county taxpayers, regarding the issue of puni-
tive damages.' 8 He stated that Defendant Pierce County had "only about
6,000 people in it," and that county taxpayers would be concerned about
the impact a punitive damages award would have upon their county
taxes.19 Counsel for Pierce County claimed these taxpayer-jurors would
be reluctant to grant punitive damages against the county.2 0
10. Record at 27, Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d 99 (N.D. 1993) (No. 920142) [hereinafter Record];
Wold's Brief, supra note 4, at 4.
11. Id.
12. d.; Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 102.
13. Wold's Brief, supra note 4, at 4-5. Under section 28-14-06 of the North Dakota Century
Code, prospective jurors may be dismissed for cause on one or more of the following grounds:
1. A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by la-w to render a person competent as
a juror;
2. Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party;
3. Standing in the relation of guardian and ward, master and servant, debtor and
creditor, employer and employee, attorney and client, or principal and agent to either
party, or being a member of the family of either party, or being a partner in-business with
either party, or surety on any bond or obligation for either party;
4. Having served as a juror or been a witness on a previous trial between the same
parties for the same claim for relief;
5. Interest on the part of the juror in the event of his action, or in the main question
involved in the action, except his interest as a member or citizen of a municipal
corporation;
6. Having an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the action founded upon
knowledge of its material facts or some of them;
7. The existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity against or bias for or
against either party; or
8. That he does not understand the English language as used in the courts.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-14-06 (1991).
14. Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 101.
15. Id at 101-102.
16. Id. at 102.
17. Wold's Brief, supra note 4, at 5; Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 102.
18. Record, supra note 10, at 505.
19. Id. at 505-506.
20. Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d at 102.
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Slaubaugh's counsel also was uneasy about pretrial publicity.2' The
Pierce County Tribune had run a story in April of 1991, about a year prior
to the start of the second trial, regarding the drugs and drug parapherna-
lia involved in the accident.' In addition, local media coverage relating
to the case continued to be extensiveY2 Slaubaugh's counsel asserted that
there was no way to assure that pretrial publicity about the case and the
fact that drugs were found in Slaubaugh's possession would not enter into
the jury's verdict.2
It was also noted by Slaubaugh's counsel that it appeared "everybody
seems to know everybody.""3 There apparently were numerous interrela-
tionships between prospective jurors, litigants, and witnesses. 26 Addition-
ally, there was concern about undisclosed bias and prejudice on the part
of the jurors.
The district court determined that in its discretion, it was impossible
to impanel a fair and impartial jury in Pierce County, and granted
Slaubaugh's motion for change of venue.2
Defendants Wold, Pierce County and Wilmer Slaubaugh all
appealed, contending the district court abused its discretion by changing
venue.2 9 The defendants asserted that Slaubaugh waived her right to seek
a change of venue by failing to challenge prospective jurors for cause dur-
ing voir dire.30 The defendants further contended that there was no basis
to conclude that a fair and impartial trial could not take place in Pierce
County, as twenty prospective jurors had already been approved by the
21. Record, supra note 10, at 506.
22. id
23. Id
24. Id In the first trial, the supreme court found that the district court improperly allowed the
defendants to overemphasize the marijuana possession issue "resulting in a trial of her character
rather than a trial of the merits." Slaubaugh 1, 466 N.W.2d at 580. A pretrial ruling before the second
trial prohibited introduction of evidence of marijuana and drug paraphernalia found in Slaubaugh's
possession at the accident scene. Slaubaugh 11, 499 NAV.2d at 101. Therefore, the parties were
precluded from asking prospective jurors about that issue. Id As a result, Slaubaugh's counsel was
concerned that he could not inquire of jurors about their knowledge of Slaubaugh's drug possession.
See Record, supra note 10, at 506.
25. Record, supra note 10, at 506.
26. Id; Slaubaugh II, 499 N.V.2d at 102-103.
27. Brief for Appellee at 6, Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d 99 (N.D. 1993) (No. 920142); Record,
supra note 10, at 507-510, 512, 522. The undisclosed bias or prejudice claim relates to general juror
reluctance to admit bias or prejudice. See Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Boschker, 289 N.W.2d 553,
559 (N.D. 1980) (holding that the trial court was allowed great latitude on voir dire examination in
order to disclose any existing bias or prejudice on the part of jurors). In Basin Electric, the supreme
court questioned whether a concern that jurors are reluctant to admit bias or prejudice was a valid
contention. 289 NAV.2d at 559.
28. Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d at 104; Record, supra note 10, at 542. The court certified its
order as a final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, which
allows a court to direct ently of a final judgment upon a determination that there is no "Just reason for
delay." Slaubaugh 1I, 499 N.W.2d at 104 n.5 (quoting N.D. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
29. Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 104.
30. Id
678 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:675
parties.31 Additionally, they charged that the district court's order was
based "on a belief that the prospective jurors were not telling the truth."32
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed whether a
party who fails to challenge prospective jurors for statutory cause waives
its right to seek a change of venue for inability to obtain a fair and impar-
tial trial. 3 The supreme court further addressed what it considered
"implicit" in the defendants' abuse of discretion argument; that when con-
sidering whether to change venue, a district court may not look beyond
the statutory criteria for removal of jurors3 4
The supreme court rejected the defendants' arguments and affirmed
the district court's order changing venue. 3 It held that a plaintiff does
not waive the right to seek a change of venue by failing to challenge pro-
spective jurors for cause during voir dire. 6 It further held that when
considering a motion to change venue to obtain a fair and impartial trial, a
trial court may consider more than the statutory criteria for the removal of
jurors .3 7
II. BACKGROUND
The term "venue" originally meant the county from which the jury
was to come. 3 The rule under early English common law was that a jury
of one county could not try a matter which arose in another county.3 9
Jurors of the locality were witnesses to prove or disprove the allegations of
the parties, and were presumed to have personal knowledge of the parties
and the facts of the case.40 Jury members were picked because of their
possession of prior knowledge of the facts, and they rendered their verdict
upon this prior knowledge.41
In contrast, venue in civil actions under modem law is ordinarily
fixed by constitutional and statutory provisions.4 Changes of venue or
31. Id. at 106.
32. Id
33. Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 105.
34. Id. at 106. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-14-06 (1991), supra note 13 (providing the statutory
grounds for removal of jurors for cause).
35. Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 107.
36. Id. at 105.
37. Id at 106. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-14-06 (1991), supra note 13 (setting forth the
statutory grounds for removal of jurors for cause).
38. 77 AM. Jun. 2D Venue § 1 (1975).
39. Id. § 2.
40. Id.
41. John Marshall Mitnick From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs. Te Transformation of
the English CivilJuror, 32 AM. J. LEoAL Hisr. 201, 202 (1988).
42. 77 AM. Jun. 2o Venue § 3; Cavalier County v. Geston, 31 N.W.2d 787, 789 (N.D. 1948)
(discussing statutory provisions for venue of civil actions in North Dakota). The North Dakota civil
venue statute, section 28-04-05 of the North Dakota Century Code, has been the law in North
Dakota ever since it was "embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure of the Territory of Dakota of
1877." Thorson v. Weimer, 230 N.W. 596, 598 (N.D. 1930).
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place of the trial are generally permitted under modem venue statutes.43
There are many statutory bases for seeking a change of venue, such as
local prejudice, bias, and inability to obtain a fair and impartial trial in the
particular county.44 Jurors no longer serve as witnesses in trials and are
not desired to possess any knowledge of the parties or facts of the case.
5
Rather, a jury is sought which is comprised of "a panel of impartial, 'indif-
ferent' jurors."46
In North Dakota, a defendant has a statutory right to trial of an
action in the county of his or her residence. 47 This right is subject to the
power of the court to change the place of trial as provided in the relevant
statute.48 In American State Bank of Dickinson v. Hoffelt,49 the supreme
court stated that a defendant's right to trial at his or her place of residence
is a "significant factor" which the court is "bound" to take into account
when considering a motion for change of venue.50
Ordinarily, a trial court defers ruling on a motion for change of
venue until or upon completion of voir dire, as any existing prejudice in
the potential jurors can usually be determined by the voir dire examina-
tion.-5 However, in Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v. First National Bank &
Trust Co.,5 2 the supreme court held that a trial court need not wait until
voir dire to determine whether a fair and impartial jury could be
selected.-"
43. 77 Am. Jun. 2D Venue § 48.
44. 1& § 58.
45. Mitnick, supra note 41, at 202.
46. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). See also Mitnick, supra note 41 (analyzing the
evolution of juror selection for their personal knowledge to that based upon lack of knowledge of the
parties and issues of the case).
47. Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 106. Section 28-04-05 of the North Dakota Century Code
states:
Actions having venue where defendant resides.
In all other cases, except as provided in section 28-04-03.1. and subject to the power of
the court to change the place of trial as provided by statute, the action must be tried in
the county in which the defendant or one of the defendants resides at the time of the
commencement of the action ....
N.D. CENr. CODE § 28-04-05 (1991).
48. N.D. CEN. CODE § 28-04-05 (1991). See infra note 53 (identifying circumstances under
which a court may change venue).
49. 246 N.W.2d 484 (N.D. 1976).
50. American State Bank of Dickinson v. Hoffelt, 246 N.W.2d 484, 487 (N.D. 1976). See also
Bartholomay v. St. Thomas Lumber Co., 124 N.W.2d 481.485 (N.D. 1963) (stating that this statutory
right is not to be "taken away except for good cause shown"). The burden is on the party seeking the
change in venue to establish facts vhich warrant the ourt making the change. Id.; Haugo v. Hand
349 N.W.2d 25. 27 (N.D. 1984). A change of venue has been characterized as an -extraordinary
remedy." Basin Electric. 289 N.W.2d 553, 559 (N.D. 1980)(citing Olson v. North Dakota Dist. Court,
Etc., 271 N.W.2d 574, 583 (N.D. 1978)).
51. See Basin Elecric, 289 N.W.2d at 559 (maintaining use of "extensive voir dire" should help
insure the selection of a jury panel which is reasonably free of prejudice).
52. 440 N.W.2d 704 (N.D. 1989).
53. Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 440 N.W.2d 704, 711 (N.D.
1989). In Knoepfle v. Suko, 114 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1962), the supreme court recognized that the
question of whether a change of venue is necessary to obtain a fair and impartial trial is a question
680 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:675
In Jemj Harmon Motors,' the supreme court stated that in a motion
for change of venue pursuant to section 28-04-07(2) of the North Dakota
Century Code, the "primary consideration" is "whether a fair and impar-
tial trial" is possible in the county.,55 Motions for change of venue on this
basis frequently include claims of local prejudice,56 pretrial publicity,5"
and taxpayer interest.5a Although prior decisions of the supreme court
have not articulated a precise test or rule to follow in assessing whether
the quantum of evidence presented is sufficient to establish that a fair and
impartial trial can be had in the county, the court will look to whether
there is a "reasonable and intelligent basis" for the trial court's decision.5 9
In discussing what would constitute an impartial jury, the United
States Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd60 stated that a juror need not be
"totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved."6 1 In Irvin, the Supreme
Court held that an impartial jury may be had if a juror "can lay aside [his
or her] impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence
which the presiding judge is in a better position to determine, "having knowledge of all of the facts
and circumstances of the case." Knoepfle, 114 N.W.2d at 56. Section 28-04-07 of the North Dakota
Century Code sets forth circumstances when a court may change venue: Court may change venue
Cases. The court may change the place of trial in the following cases:
1. When the county designated for that purpose in the complaint is not the proper
county.
2. When there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had therein.
3. When the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by
the change.
4. Where upon the call of the calendar at any regular or special term there appears to
be an insufficient number of jury cases for trial to warrant the expense of a jury, the court,
on application of any party to such an action, or on its own motion, taking into
consideration the convenience of witnesses and the promotion of justice, may order the
transfer of such jury cases as are on the calendar to any county within the judicial district
where the jury session of court vill be held in the immediate future, so that a prompt trial
of such cases may be had.
N.D. CTr. CODE § 28-04-07 (1991). The basis for the change of venue in Slaubaugh II was to
obtain a fair and impartial trial, and thus, this comment will focus on a party's ability to change venue
on that basis, pursuant to section 28-04-07(2) of the North Dakota Century Code. Slaubaugh 1I, 499
N.W.2d at 106.
54. 440 N.W.2d 704 (N.D. 1989).
55. Jerry Harmon Motors, 440 N.W.2d 704, 711 (N.D. 1989) (affirming trial court order
granting motion for change of venue pursuant to section 28-04-07(2) of the North Dakota Century
Code). For a review of section 28-04-07(2), see supra note 53.
56. 77 Am. JuR. 20 Venue § 59.
57. Id § 60.
58. Id. § 59.
59. Hanson v. Carvood Industries, 279 N.W.2d 647, 650 (N.D. 1979) (finding that the trial
court abused its discretion in changing venue on the basis of a single affidavit which stated an
impartial trial could not be had in the county because one of the defendants was a major city in that
county). See also American State Bank, 246 N.W.2d 484, 486 (N.D. 1976) (stating that moving
parties must "affirmatively establish facts" entitling them to a change of venue, and any affidavits in
support of the motion must state "specifics" from which a trial court can make its determination);
Linington v. McLean County, 150 N.W.2d 239, 240 (N.D. 1967) (stating that the trial court weighs
the allegations and contentions of parties in reaching its conclusion).
60. 366 U.S. 717 (1960).
61. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
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presented in court."62  Similarly, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
stated that a jury with no prior knowledge may be "ideal to strive for," but
it is not absolutely required. 3
The North Dakota Supreme Court confronted juror impartiality in
the context of a motion for change of venue in Haugo v. Haaland."4 The
supreme court in Haugo held that a mere assertion of the taxpayer status
of potential jurors in an action against a municipality is insufficient to
obtain a change of venue.' As a general proposition, a juror's interest as
a taxpayer is not an automatic disqualification from service.68
Noting its decision in Sheridan County v. Davis,7 the supreme court
in Haugo stated that although an individual juror may not be subject to
challenge for cause on the basis of his or her taxpayer status, a transfer of
a case may be required if it appears that all prospective jurors will have a
taxpayer interest adverse to the moving party.68 Yet, the supreme court
has acknowledged that if it were only necessary to assert that prospective
jurors were taxpayers, no action could be tried where a municipality was
involved as a defendant in the suit.69 Accordingly, Haugo supports the
proposition that standing alone, the assertion of a "taxpayer interest" on
the part of potential jurors would be an insufficient basis for granting a
motion for change of venue.70 However, where it is one of "several fac-
tors" in the decision to grant change of venue, it would not be an abuse of
discretion for a trial judge to take it into consideration.71
The controlling case in North Dakota using pretrial publicity as a
basis for a change of venue is Olson v. North Dakota District Court.72
Olson set forth eight factors for determining whether there was a reason-
62. Id. at 723. Although Irvin was a criminal case, it is often cited for the same proposition as
applied to civil trials. See Cummins v. Rachner, 257 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Minn. 1977) (citing Irvin
language in a wrongful death action); Claxton Poultry Co. v. City of Claxton, 271 S.E.2d 227, 232 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1980) (citing Irvin language in a negligence action).
63. State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664, 666 (N.D. 1980).
64. 349 N.W.2d 25 (N.D. 1984).
65. Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25, 28 (N.D. 1984).
66. Sheridan County v. Davis, 240 N.W. 867, 871 (N.D. 1932) (opining that interest as a
taxpayer generally does not disqualify a person from serving as a juror in an action against a public
corporation); Marshall v. City of Beach. 294 N.W.2d 623, 627 (N.D. 1980) (stating that the statutory
provisions on challenges of jurors for cause recognize that a juror is still competent despite a taxpayer
interest in the outcome of the suit). See supra note 13 (providing text of N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-14-
06(5) (1991)).
67. 240 N.W. 867 (N.D. 1932).
68. Haugo, 349 N.W.2d at 28.
69. Hanson v. Garwood, 279 N.W.2d at 649 (citing Maier v. City of Ketchikan, 403 P.2d 34
(Alaska 1965)); Marshall, 294 N.W.2d 623, 627 (N.D. 1980). See also Jerry Harmon Motors, 440
N.W.2d 704, 709 (N.D. 1989) (rejecting the contention that a fair and impartial trial could not be had
in the county where potential jurors included a large number of customers with deposits with the
defendant, one of the largest banking organizations in the county).
70. Haugo, 349 N.W.2d at 28.
71. Id.
72. 271 N.W.2d 574 (N.D. 1978).
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able likelihood of prejudice resulting from pretrial publicity.73 Although
Olson was a criminal case, the supreme court in Basin Electric Power
Coop. v. Boschker stated that four of the eight Olson factors were also
relevant in considering a motion for change of venue in a civil action with
a similar claim.74 The factors from Olson which the court found pertinent
were: (1) whether the pretrial publicity was recent, widespread, or dam-
aging; (2) whether a party or a third person was responsible for the objec-
tionable material; (3) whether any inconvenience to the parties and
administration of justice would result by changing venue; and (4) whether
a substantially better juror panel could be obtained at another time or
place.5 A "substantially better juror panel" presumably refers to a loca-
tion which has avoided the effects and influence of the pretrial
publicity.76
Ultimately, the question in a motion for change of venue based on
section 28-04-07(2) of the North Dakota Century Code is "whether or
not it is impossible to select a fair and impartial jury."' The supreme
court has not outlined when it would be impossible to select a fair and
impartial jury. Therefore, in making its determination, trial courts can
only look for guidance from past decisions on change of venue and those
discussing what constitutes a fair and impartial jury.78
III. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
The decision in Slaubaugh 11 may be viewed as allowing a party
unsatisfied with his or her jury panel to seek a change of venue, and an
opportunity to get a more favorable panel elsewhere.
73. Olson v. North Dakota District Court, 271 N.W.2d 574, 580 (N.D. 1978).
74. Basin Electric, 289 N.W.2d at 558.
75. Id. The four additional factors to consider in a criminal case are: (1) the nature andrvity
of the offense; (2) the size of the community; (3) the status of the defendant in the community; r4) the
popularity and prominence of the victim(s). Id at n.1 (citing Olson, 271 N.W.2d at 580). The
supreme court concluded the pretrial publicity in Basin Electric was 'not nearly as inflammatory nor
widespread as in Olson." Id In Olson, the defendant was charged with the murder of his wife. Id
He was further charged with the subsequent murder of a sixteen year-old local girl. There was
widespread pretrial publicity consisting of approximately 56 news articles in a span of less than two
years concerning the arrest, pretrial proceedings, trial, and sentencing of Olson. I& Furthermore,
there was extensive television coverage concerning the two murders. Id. Such extensive and
widespread coverage created a -substantial and reasonable" likelihood that Olson could not obtain a
fair trial in the county. Id The defendants in Basin Electric based their motion to change venue on
three articles appearing in a magazine which was disseminated primarily to rural electric customers,
as well as a letter sent to members of an electric cooperative. Id. The supreme court determined that
it would be impossible to determine the number of potential jurors who had access to, and actually
read these materials. Id
76. See Olson, 271 N.W.2d at 582 (stating that venue should be changed to a community which
has escaped the influences of the pretrial publicity).
77. Basin Electric, 289 N.W.2d at 559. For a review of section 28-04-07(2), see supra note 53.
78. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing prior change of venue decisions to obtain
a fair and impartial trial). See also notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes an
impartial jury).
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The court in Slaubaugh II held that failure to challenge prospective
jurors for cause during voir dire did not waive a party's right to seek a
change of venue.79 A failure to so challenge jurors, however, does waive
any objections to their selection as jurors.80 The court theorized that a
broader analysis by the trial court is required when confronted with a
claim to change venue to obtain a fair and impartial trial.81 No authority
was cited for this proposition, except the court noted that challenges to
individual jurors for cause82 focused on individual jurors.83
The court further stated that a trial court should give weight to the
fact that a party did not challenge a prospective juror for cause when
deciding a motion for change of venue." Further, if a party's claims of
juror impartiality are unsupported by voir dire testimony, the trial court
should view the motion "skeptically."s A party who believes a motion to
change venue was improperly granted can challenge the decision on
appeal as an abuse of the trial court discretion. 6
A further issue which the supreme court addressed in Slaubaugh Ii
which it considered to be implicit in defendants' abuse of discretion argu-
ment was whether trial courts may look beyond the statutory criteria87 for
removing jurors for cause when considering a change of venue to obtain a
fair and impartial trial." The court stated that a determination of
whether a fair and impartial trial in a particular county is possible
demands analyzing the jury as a whole as well as the place of trial.89 It
reasoned that jury decisions are not "rendered in a vacuum," and that
juries, not individual jurors, decide cases.90 Therefore, the court deduced
that although there may not be grounds to remove an individual juror for
cause, the sum of individual juror characteristics may justify a change of
venue.91 By implication, this includes factors other than those included in
section 28-14-06 of the North Dakota Century Code for challenging indi-
vidual jurors for cause.9 2 Thus, the trial court must be allowed to con-
79. Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 105.
80. Idt (citing Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Miller, 310 N.W.2d 715, 719 (N.D. 1981)).
81. Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 105.
82. Supra note 13.
83. Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 105.
84. 1l
85. 1d
86. Id at 105-106.
87. See supra note 13.
88. Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 106.
89. Id The court observed that challenges for statutory cause focus on the characteristics of
individual jurors. Id at 105.
90. Id at 106.
91. Id at 107.
92. Slaubaugh I, 499 N.W.2d at 106-107. See supra note 13 (reviewing the statutory bases for
challenging individual jurors for cause).
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sider the "aggregate effect of many factors," even though there may be
insufficient grounds to remove a juror for cause.3
In rendering this decision, the court identified factors which, stand-
ing alone, would be insufficient to justify a change of venue.94 The court
looked at taxpayer interest,w "common gossip" (that is, pretrial public-
ity),, 8 and familiarity with counsel.97 For the first time, the supreme
court stated that trial courts could "consider the aggregate effect" of the
connections between prospective jurors, witnesses, parties, and counsel in
its change of venue determination.
Surrogate Judge Pederson9 submitted a short dissent. He first drew
attention to section 28-04-05 of the North Dakota Century Code,99 which
assures defendants that lawsuits against them will be tried in the county in
which they live, subject to the power of the court to change the place of
trial as provided in the statute.100 Prior decisions of the supreme court
have recognized that the right of a defendant to be tried in the county of
his or her residence is a "significant factor"''l 0 which should not be "taken
away except for good cause shown." 02 The majority opinion did not dis-
cuss these decisions. Judge Pederson urged that the exception "should
not supersede the purpose of the statute."'03
Judge Pederson also noted the problem of appellate review of the
subjective trial court decision on change of venue under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard' 4 He cautioned that ad hoc determinations by a trial
judge may allow law to be made out of the judge's "idiosyncrasies."'0 s
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
Judge Pederson's dissent raises several important implications of the
decision in Slaubaugh I. First, the decision may impact trials in rural
North Dakota counties. 1°6 Of the fifty-three counties in North Dakota,
twenty have fewer than 4,000 residents.' These figures include all resi-
93. 1I at 107.
94. See iL at 107 n.7, 108.
95. 1I at 106 (discussing Haugo, 349 N.W.2d 25, 28 (N.D. 1984)).
96. Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d at 106 n.7 (citing State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1980)).
97. Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d at 106-07.
98. Sitting in place of Neumann, J., disqualified.
99. Supra note 47.
100. Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d at 107 (Pederson, S.J. dissenting).
101. Amrnican State Bank, 246 N.W.2d at 487.
102. Bartholomay, 124 N.W.2d at 485.
103. Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 107 (Pederson, S.J. dissenting).
104. Id. at 108.
105. Id
106. Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d at 107 (Pederson, S.J. dissenting).
107. 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
ADMINISTRATION, BunRAu OF TIlE CENSUS, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS NORTh
DAKOTA 1 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 CENSUS].
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dents in the county, including minors who would not be competent to be
jurors.108 Thus, the pool from which to draw potential jurors in these
counties is relatively small.
The rationale in Slaubaugh 11 suggests that a trial court may "aggre-
gate" factors and consider the "cumulative effect" of connections among
potential jurors, litigants, and witnesses. 109 Lawsuits against a county, a
major city, or a large business within a small rural county will be particu-
larly vulnerable to a plaintiff's claim that a fair and impartial trial is not
possible. For example, a plaintiff may have a taxpayer interest argument
in a suit against a county or municipality. Further, there would be an
increased likelihood of a Slaubaugh II scenario where there were interre-
lationships and familiarity between the litigants, attorneys, witnesses, and
jurors simply because of the limited juror pool from which to select a
jury."0 In light of this, it is difficult to explain the supreme court's earlier
statement in Hanson v. Garwood,"' which articulated that a fair trial can
be had in a county where a major city is a defendant."12
Thus, under Slaubaugh II, a trial court will be allowed to consider
the "aggregate effect" of many factors when deciding a motion for change
of venue under section 28-04-07(2) of the North Dakota Century
Code.113 Although each of these factors, considered alone, may not be
sufficient to provide a rational and reasonable basis to change venue, after
Slaubaugh II, trial courts now may view all factors "as a whole" and
may consider the "cumulative effect of the connections" in its
determination. 114
In State v. Olson,"-' the supreme court declared that it is not an
absolute requirement that a jury have no prior knowledge of the facts
surrounding the case. 1 6 Furthermore, in State v. McLain,"' the court
pronounced that "great weight" was to be given to a juror's statement
during voir dire that he or she will serve as a fair and impartial juror."18
The decision in Slaubaugh II appears to be contrary to these decisions
108. Id.
109. See Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 106.
110. Consider, for example, the possible interconnections in a small rural county such as Slope,
which according to the 1990 Census had a population of 907. 1990 CENSUS, supra note 107, at 1.
111. 279 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1979).
112. Hanson v. Carwood, 279 N.W.2d 647, 650 (N.D. 1979). The court cited the example of
Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1978). Falkenstein was an action against the
Bismarck Police Department for the suicide of plaintiff's son. Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck, 268
N.W.2d 787, 789 (N.D. 1978). A juxy rendered a verdict against the City. Id.
113. Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d at 106. For a review of section 28-04-07(2), see supra note 53.
114. Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d at 107.
115. 290 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1980).
116. State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664, 666 (N.D. 1980).
117. 301 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1981).
118. State v. McLain, 301 N.W.2d 616, 622 (N.D. 1981). See also State v. Olson, 274 N.W.2d
190, 193 (N.D. 1978) (stating that "the court will not readily discount the assurances of a juror as to
his impartiality").
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and the court's belief that "jurors in North Dakota have a high regard for
the truth, the oath, and our judicial system."" 9 In Slaubaugh II, the
supreme court explicitly rejects this contention: "Our holding does not
alter our firm belief that the jurors of North Dakota have a high regard
for the truth, the oath, and our judicial system." 20 However, the decision
leaves the impression that in less populated counties, jurors may not be
trusted to lay aside any biases, impressions, or opinions and render a ver-
dict based on the evidence presented at trial.' 2 1 The North Dakota bar
can only wait and see how this decision impacts jury trials in the smaller
rural counties.
A related ramification raised by Judge Pederson's dissent is the
impact of the decision on the statutory right of defendants to be tried in
the county of their residence, subject to a court's power to change
venue.'22 The supreme court has previously held that a defendant has an
absolute right to have an action tried in the county of his or her resi-
dence.'2 3 Following Slaubaugh 1I, this "absolute right" of a defendant
appears to be swallowed up by the exception that the trial court may
change the place of the trial pursuant to section 28-04-07 of the North
Dakota Century Code.' 24 Furthermore, the supreme court has previously
recognized that it is not in the public interest to impose jury duty on
people in a community which has no relationship with the litigation.'22
Finally, the abuse of discretion standard of review for grants or deni-
als of motions for change of venue makes the implications of Slaubaugh 11
more troublesome. In these types of cases, the supreme court has gener-
ally held that the lower courts did not abuse their discretion when the
motions were made on the ground that a fair and impartial trial could not
be had in the county in which the action was commenced. 126 However, in
119. Basin Electric, 289 N.W.2d at 559.
120. Slaubaugh I1, 499 N.W.2d at 107.
121. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723 (stating that impartial jurors are those which can lay aside
impressions or opinions and render a verdict on the evidence presented in court).
'122. Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d at 107 (Pederson, S.J. dissenting). See N.D. CETrr. CoDE § 28-
04-05, supra note 47 (quoting the statute).
123. Dorgan v. Mercil, 269 N.W.2d 99, 104 (N.D. 1978)(citing American State Bank v. Hoffelt,
246 N.W.2d 484 (N.D. 1976)); Summers v. Summers, 24 N.V.2d 688, 689 (N.D. 1946); Springer v.
Paulson, 9 N.W.2d 440, 442 (N.D. 1943).
124. See Slaubaugh 11, 499 N.W.2d at 107. For a review of the basis on which a trial court may
change venue see section 28-04-07 of the North Dakota Century Code, supra note 53.
125. Hanson, 279 N.W.2d at 649 (citing Maier, 403 P.2d 34, 39-40 (Alaska (1965)). See also
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947) (stating that "there is a local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home").
126. Jerry Harmon Motors, 440 N.W.2d at 710. Prior supreme court decisions include: Haugo,
349 N.W.2d 2.5, 29 (N.D. 1984) (affirming change of venue); Marshall v. City of Beach, 294 N.W.2d
623,628 (N.D. 1980) (affurming denial orchange of venue); Basin Electric Power, 289 N.W.2d 553,
560 (N.D. 1980) (affirming change of venue); Linington, 150 N.W.2d 239,240 (N.D. 1967) (affirming
change of venue); Knoepfle, 114 N.W.2d 54, 56 (N.D. 1962) (affirming denial of change of venue);
Hovland v. Waller, 98 N.W.2d 893, 895 (N.D. 1959) (affirming change of venue); Brace v. Steele
County, 50 N.W.2d 90,91 (N.D. 1951) (affirming change of venue); Farmers' State Bank of Harvey v.
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Hanson v. Ganvood,12 7 the supreme court did reverse an order granting a
plaintiff's motion for change of venue.12l  Nevertheless, Hanson129 is the
only case in which the supreme court reversed a trial court's decision to
change venue on the basis that a fair and impartial trial could not be had
in the county.
A trial court's determination of whether a fair and impartial trial is
possible in a county is by nature a subjective determination. Conse-
quently, the "amorphous" abuse of discretion standard of review is diffi-
cult for appellate courts to apply consistently.130
By way of contrast, in criminal actions the appellate court, when
reviewing a change of venue decision, makes "an independent review of
the record to determine if a reasonable likelihood of prejudice exists,
giving appreciable weight to the trial court's findings of fact .... ,,3  Such
an enhanced standard of review would also give the supreme court the
ability to provide some direction to district courts regarding the factors
which may properly be considered and the weight that each should be
given in a motion for change of venue to obtain a fair and impartial trial.
A more meaningful analysis of the appropriateness of trial court evalua-
tions would then be possible. It may also help to alleviate the problem
which Judge Pederson characterized as making "law out of every judge's
idiosyncrasies.' 13 2
Jacqueline S. Anderson
Hager, 225 N.W. 128, 129 (N.D. 1929) (affirming change of venue); Kaczor v. Swendseid, 215 N.W.
271, 272 (N.D. 1927) (affirming denial of change of venue); Langer v. Courier News, 186 N.V. 102,
103 (N.D. 1921) (affirming denial of change of venue); Stockwel[v. Haigh. 135 N.W. 764, 766 (N.D.
1912) (affirming change ofvenue); Boeren v. McWilliams, 157 N.W. 117, 119 (N.D. 1916) (affirming
denial of change of venue).
127. 279 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1979).
128. Hanson v. Garwood, 279 N.W.2d 647, 650 (N.D. 1979). In Hanson, the trial court had
granted a change of venue based upon a single affidavit stating that an impartial trial could not be had
in the county. Id. at 649. The supreme court held that " was an abuse of discretion, since the
affidavit merely stated an impartial trial could not be had in a county where one of the defendants was
a major city in the county. Id. at 648, 650.
129. 279 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1979).
130. W. Wendell Hall, Revisiting Standards of Review in Civil Appeals, 24 ST. MARY's L.J. 1045,
1051 (1993).
131. Olson v. North Dakota Dist. Court, Etc., 271 N.W.2d 574, 579 (N.D. 1978). The court
stated that this standard is "comparable" to 'the model outlined by the United States Supreme Court
in Sheppard v. Maxwell (384 U.S. 333 (1966)1." Id.
132. Slaubaugh II, 499 N.W.2d at 108 (Pederson, S.J. dissenting).
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